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1 
RE-DEMOCRATIZING PALESTINIAN 
POLITICS 
George E. Bisharat*
ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this article is to examine the contemporary 
challenges to re-democratization in Palestinian politics.  Such an 
examination is timely as the current leadership of the Palestinian people, 
institutionalized in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), is viewed by many Palestinians as out of touch 
with their needs, and overly prepared to sacrifice their perceived rights and 
interests in negotiations with Israel.  Palestinian politics have never been 
fully democratic.  It follows that for Palestinian politics to be successfully 
democratized today, it is not sufficient to simply return to past practices nor 
to restore pre-existing institutions to their previous statuses. 
This article analyzes the impact of two persistent obstacles to 
Palestinian democratic development—geographic dispersion and 
fragmentation of the Palestinians; and intervention by external powers, 
including the Arab states, the United States, and Israel—and considers the 
extent to which these obstacles were overcome in the past.  It addresses the 
process of de-democratization to which Palestinian political institutions and 
practices have been subjected since the high water mark of Palestinian 
democratic achievement during the first intifada (1987-1993). 
De-democratization is evident in two processes, characterized here as 
the “downsizing of Palestine” (by which Palestine has been reduced, 
*Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law.  The author would like to thank
audiences at UCLA School of Law, the Center for Palestine Studies at Columbia University,
and New York University for their thoughtful questions and comments regarding the ideas
presented herein.  The remaining shortcomings, of course, are the sole responsibility of the
author.
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conceptually and administratively, to the West Bank) and the “domestication 
of the Palestinians” (by which Palestinians, through their security forces, 
have become guardians of their own occupiers).  The article reviews the 
intensifying demands for democratization that have been emerging in 
Palestinian society within the last several years and considers how these 
demands have articulated with the uprisings in other Arab countries, 
sometimes labeled the “Arab Spring.” The prescriptions that Palestinians 
themselves are currently discussing for strengthening their own practice of 
democracy include national reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas, 
reform of the PLO, and abolition of the PA.  All of these prescriptions hold 
some promise, particularly as each would help revive political interaction 
and discussion among all Palestinians, wherever they are situated.  But none 
is truly sufficient, and each bears potentially significant costs.  One of the 
most difficult questions currently facing Palestinians is whether to reorient 
their struggle from one aiming to achieve national liberation in an 
independent state - the prospects of which seem increasingly dim, in light of 
ongoing Israeli colonization of the West Bank - to one seeking equal civil 
and political rights in what has emerged as a functionally unitary state in 
Israel and the Palestinian territories it occupies.  This might require a 
fundamental reevaluation of what it means to be “Palestinian,” and the 
abandonment of ethno-religious criteria for identity in favor of a new 
concept of democratic citizenship. 
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Re-Democratizing Palestinian Politics 3 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of this article implies that Palestinian politics1 have been more 
democratic in the past than they are today.  That implication is fully 
intentional.  This paper will argue that Palestinian politics, indeed, have been 
more democratic in the past than they are now.  In this author’s view, 
Palestinian politics reached their democratic zenith in the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s, during the first Palestinian intifada.2  Since that time, 
Palestinian democratic practices have been in gradual, if not precipitous, 
decline, so much so that Palestinians today face what might be fairly 
characterized as a crisis of representation and accountability.  The depth of 
Palestinian public dismay with their leaders was palpable in a recent 
description by Omar Barghouti, a prominent activist in the Palestinian 
movement for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against Israel, who 
referred to Palestinian leadership as “unelected, unrepresentative, 
unprincipled, and visionless.”3
The main objective of this article is to both trace the arc of Palestinian 
democracy and try to explain it, while also offering some observations on 
how that arc may again be turned upward. It should be immediately clarified, 
however, that Palestinian politics have never been fully democratic.  On the 
contrary, Palestinian democratic practice has fallen short in a number of 
significant respects—to be explored soon below.
 
4
A disclosure here is necessary: in the view of this author, genuine 
  It follows from this, 
therefore, that for Palestinian politics to be successfully democratized today, 
it is not sufficient simply to return to past practices nor to restore pre-
existing institutions to their previous status.  More than that is required. 
                                                     
1 By “politics” I simply mean the institutions, practices, and norms by which a society or 
group of people manages power and authority in public life. 
2 “Intifada” is derived from the Arabic verb meaning to “shake off;” it is commonly 
translated as “uprising.”  The term first began to be widely used in reference to the political 
upheaval that swept the Gaza Strip and West Bank beginning in late 1987, aiming to “shake 
off” or end Israeli military occupation that persisted for several years before tapering off 
inconclusively in 1992.  See Mark Tessler, Intifada: 1987-1992, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
PALESTINIANS 182, 182-90 (Philip Mattar ed., 2000).  A second Palestinian intifada broke out 
in October 2000 that is sometimes identified as the “al-Aqsa intifada” because it followed a 
politically provocative visit by Ariel Sharon, campaigning to become prime minister of Israel, 
to the “Haram ash-Sharif” or Holy Mount that includes al-Aqsa Mosque.  A variety of 
perspectives on the second or “al-Aqsa” intifada are offered in THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY (Joel Beinin & Rebecca L. Stein eds., 2006). 
3 OMAR BARGHOUTI, BDS: BOYCOTT, DIVESTMENT, SANCTIONS 7 (2011). 
4 See infra Part II. 
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democracy—defined most broadly as any set of institutions, practices, and 
norms that enact the people’s will in public policy—is good, for Palestinians 
and for others.5
 Notwithstanding the fact that the most progressive and democratic 
forces in Palestinian society have historically, been hostile to Israel and its 
government’s policies, it is likely that genuine democracy among 
Palestinians ultimately will be good for their neighbors, particularly for 
Israeli Jews.
  Palestinian leaders should represent and strive to implement 
the interests of their people and mechanisms of accountability should exist 
and function if and when Palestinian leaders fail in their essential 
responsibilities.  Needless to say, this is a normative position to which not all 
need subscribe.  But it is one to which this author subscribes and, moreover, 
is a point of departure for this article and therefore will be assumed rather 
than defended here. 
6
The reader will note the stress in the paragraph above on genuine 
democracy.  I stress the term genuine democracy so as to highlight the 
distinction between it and apparent democracy.  This distinction seems 
necessary because of the occasional tendency in popular thinking to confuse 
or mistake the conduct of elections, and the resulting apparent democracy, 
for genuine or actual democracy.  Elections certainly can and often do 
contribute to establishing a democratic system.  However, elections can also 
be turned to anti-democratic ends, especially through the manipulation of the 
franchise.  As shall be seen below, this is a particularly salient consideration 
in recent Palestinian political history.
  Unfortunately, there are real and seemingly intractable 
differences of interest and aspiration between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli 
Jew that must one day be reconciled.  There is little to gain, however, in 
maintaining a Palestinian leadership that does not honestly, forthrightly, and 
firmly articulate its people’s positions on issues of critical concern.  The 
absence of a truly representative Palestinian leadership simply means that 
the difficult challenges in negotiating a fair accommodation with Israeli Jews 
will continue unresolved. 
7
This article next examines the substantial obstacles to Palestinian 
 
                                                     
5 There are many definitions of democracy, but at its bare minimum it means “rule of the 
people.”  How democracy has been realized (or perhaps better, approximated) in various 
societies has varied through time and space, whether through direct or representative versions; 
my definition hews closely to the basic meaning of “rule of the people.” 
6 Moshe Ma’oz, Democratization Among West Bank Palestinians and Palestinian-Israeli 
Relations, in DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 213, 237-38 (Edy 
Kaufman, Shukri B. Abed & Robert R. Rothstein eds., 1993). 
7 See infra Part III. 
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democratic practice were negotiated and the extent to which they were 
overcome.  Part II addresses the process of “de-democratization” to which 
Palestinian political institutions and practices have been subjected since 
1993.  In Part III, the article discusses the intensifying demands for 
democratization that have been emerging in Palestinian society within the 
last several years, and considers how these demands have articulated with 
the uprisings in other Arab countries, sometimes labeled the “Arab Spring.”  
Part IV reviews and evaluates some of the prescriptions that Palestinians 
themselves are currently discussing for strengthening their own practice of 
democracy.  The final part draws some brief conclusions. 
I. THE RISE OF PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE 
A comprehensive historical survey of the rise of Palestinian democratic 
practice is beyond the scope of this article.8
a. Geographic Dispersion and Fragmentation 
  Instead, the focus of this section 
is on two enduring obstacles to the achievement of Palestinian democracy: 
geographic dispersion and the fragmentation of Palestinian societies on the 
one hand, and external intervention on the other hand.  Thereafter, we will 
turn to the rise of Palestinian democratic practice in the late 1960’s, in 
particular through the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the extent to 
which the aforementioned obstacles were overcome. 
In 1948, more than half of all Palestinians—in other words, between 
700,000 and 800,000 persons—were either forced from their homes by 
Jewish militias or fled in fear in anticipation of the same.  Palestinians refer 
to this event as the “Nakba” or “Catastrophe.”9
                                                     
8  Nor, unfortunately, is there a single source that undertakes this task.  Ma’oz, supra note 
6, presents a brief sketch of democratic practices among Palestinians from the early twentieth 
century until 1993.  RASHID KHALIDI, THE IRON CAGE (2006) (providing many great insights 
into the political challenges faced by Palestinians, although the author’s preoccupation is the 
failure of the Palestinian national movement to achieve statehood, not democracy as such). 
  The majority took refuge in 
the West Bank or Gaza Strip, although large numbers reached Lebanon, 
9  Three important studies of the Palestinian exodus of this period are NUR MASALHA, 
EXPULSION OF THE PALESTINIANS 198 (1992) (placing the number of Palestinian refugees at 
“some 750,000”); BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 
REVISITED 604 (2004) (characterizing 700,000 as a “fair estimate”); and ILAN PAPPE, THE 
ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE xiii (2006) (placing the number of displaced Palestinians at 
“close to 800,000”).  Meanwhile the pre-hostilities Arab population of Palestine was 1.25 
million.  MORRIS, supra, at 7. 
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Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.  According to Israeli sources, the June 1967 war 
caused the flight of between 200,000 and 250,000 Palestinians; some were 
refugees from 1948 while others were residents of the West Bank or Gaza 
Strip, which fell under Israeli rule for the first time.10  Most 1967 refugees 
fled eastward to Jordan.  While these two dramatic upheavals were the cause 
of flight of most Palestinians from their homes and homeland, many others 
have subsequently left due to political repression, land confiscations, 
restrictions on movement and economic opportunity, and a variety of other 
Israeli policies that seem calculated to continue the “Nakba.”11  For 
example, between 1967 and 1994, the Israeli government denied residency 
permits to nearly a quarter of a million Palestinian residents of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip who had left those territories to go abroad for work, 
study, or other reasons.12
Geographic dispersion and fragmentation has been an obstacle to 
democratic development among Palestinians in at least four significant ways.  
First, it created distinct living conditions and experiences for differently 
situated Palestinian communities.  Such communities include minority 
citizens of the state of Israel; the descendants of the roughly 140,000 
Palestinians who did not flee beyond the areas controlled by Israeli forces in 
the 1948-49 fighting today number 1.623 million.
 
13
                                                     
10 TOM SEGEV, 1967: ISRAEL, THE WAR, AND THE YEAR THAT TRANSFORMED THE MIDDLE 
EAST 410 (Jessica Cohen trans., 2005). 
  Others include more 
than four million refugees living in the surrounding Arab countries as well as 
11 See Alan Hart, Never ending Nakba, ALAN HART (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.alanhart.net/never-ending-nakba/. 
12 Akiva Eldar, Israel admits it revoked residency rights of a quarter million Palestinians, 
HAARETZ (June 12, 2012, 1:18 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-
admits-it-revoked-residency-rights-of-a-quarter-million-palestinians-1.435778. 
13 See MORRIS, supra note 9, at 603 (discussing Israeli government figures suggesting 
102,000 Palestinians remained in areas under Israeli control after 1948 and an additional 
30,000-40,000 who, after fleeing, infiltrated back); Moti Bassok, Israel’s population stands at 
nearly 8 million on its 64th Independence Day, HAARETZ (Apr. 24, 2012, 11:08 PM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-s-population-stands-at-nearly-8-million-on-its-
64th-independence-day-1.426381.  It should be noted, however, that Israel’s Central Bureau 
of Statistics counts the 360,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as part of Israel’s 
population, notwithstanding the fact that few of them have accepted Israeli citizenship.  See 
Nir Hasson, Report: 78% of East Jerusalem Palestinians live in poverty, HAARETZ (May 20, 
2012, 1:08 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/report-78-of-east-jerusalem-
palestinians-live-in-poverty-1.431384 (noting the current Palestinian population of East 
Jerusalem).  The number of Palestinian citizens of Israel, therefore, is between 1.2 and 1.3 
million. 
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further abroad,14 and four million residents of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, both under Israeli military occupation or control for the last forty-five 
years.15
Second, geographic dispersion and fragmentation have positioned the 
various Palestinian communities to be differentially impacted by different 
prospective resolutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  This is especially 
true of the two-state solution that has been formally adopted by the 
international community as its preferred model for resolution of the conflict 
in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1515.
  These differences in daily life experience have, quite naturally, 
given rise to somewhat distinct identities that challenge the unity of the 
Palestinian people.  Needless to say, democracy can only be developed 
within a “demos,” or people; when the boundaries of that “people” are 
contested, the task is all the more fraught. 
16
                                                     
14 Exact figures on the numbers of Palestinian refugees living outside the borders of former 
Mandate Palestine are not easy to find.  The United Nations Relief and Works Agency places 
the number of formally registered Palestinians in its camps in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, at 
nearly 3 million, while those residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip together just exceed 2 
million.  U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA 
Statistics-2010 5 (Nov. 2011), http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011120434013.pdf.  This 
does not count Palestinians who were refugees but did not register as such with UNRWA, nor 
does it include Palestinian refugees living in other countries, such as Iraq or Egypt, or Europe 
and the Americas. Badil, the Bethlehem-based Resource Center for Residency and Refugee 
Rights, estimated the total number of Palestinian refugees at 6.6 million in its 2008-2009 
survey.  Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2008-2009, BADIL 
(BADIL, Palestine, Bethlehem), at ix, available at 
http://www.badil.org/en/publications?page=shop.product_details&flypage=garden_flypage.tp
l&product_id=119&category_id=7.  Assuming these figures are accurate, this means there are 
approximately 1.6 million unregistered Palestinian refugees, distributed between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and those outside the borders of former Mandate Palestine.  It seems 
likely that the majority of these are outside, thus the estimate of “greater than four million.” 
  The Palestinian 
community with the most to gain by that resolution’s passing would be those 
currently suffering under Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, who would achieve at least nominal sovereignty and greater 
freedom over their lives.  Palestinian citizens of Israel, however, would 
15  The CIA world fact book estimates the total West Bank population as of July 2012 as 
just over 2.6 million, of who just over 300,000 are Israeli Jewish settlers.  WORLD FACTBOOK: 
WEST BANK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html (last 
updated Feb. 6, 2013) (click on “People and Society” tab).  The same source, meanwhile, 
estimates the July 2012 population of the Gaza Strip at just over 1.7 million.  WORLD 
FACTBOOK: GAZA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html 
(last updated Feb. 5, 2013) (click on “People and Society” tab). 
16 See S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003). 
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witness their subordinate status in Israeli society consecrated and 
perpetuated, especially if Israel’s status as a “Jewish state” is formally 
recognized in a peace agreement.  Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees living in 
exile would benefit from a two-state solution only to the extent that they 
receive the rights to return to their homes and homeland and to receive 
compensation for their losses.  As many Palestinian refugees fled from areas 
that will remain within Israel under a two-state solution, their rights of return 
will be only imperfectly realized.17
Minor internal differences are not fatal to democratic development. 
Indeed, all democratic societies live with them.  Deep schisms, however, are 
difficult to resolve via democratic means.  It is particularly challenging to 
resolve deep differences in the absence of opportunities for national 
dialogue.  This is the third respect in which geographic dispersion and 
fragmentation have inhibited Palestinian democratic development: by 
frustrating, to the point of impossibility, a coherent and consistent national 
dialogue that encompasses all three major segments of the Palestinian people 
(citizens of Israel, residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 
refugees living in exile).  Travel restrictions and other limitations on 
communication have virtually barred Palestinians from conducting the 
debate necessary to democratic decision-making regarding their respective 
futures. 
  Fragmentation, therefore, has introduced 
deep differences of interests among different segments of the Palestinian 
people. 
Finally, geographic dispersion and fragmentation established what were 
essentially Palestinian hostage communities that gave a particularly vital 
form of leverage to surrounding Arab regimes.  Regimes that hosted 
Palestinian populations could, by implicit threat if not explicit action, exert 
pressure on Palestinian leaders and force them to answer not only to the 
needs of the Palestinian people, but also to the preferences of those regimes. 
b. External Intervention 
The key reality to highlight here is that Palestinians have never had the 
space—that is to say, their own state—within which to elaborate democratic 
                                                     
17  These rights were first recognized by the international community in United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1949.  G.A. Res. 194 (III), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc A/RES/194 
(III) (Dec. 11, 1948).  The author provides a fuller exploration of the differential impact of a 
two-state solution on differently situated Palestinian communities in George E. Bisharat, 
Maximizing Rights: The One-State Solution to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 8 GLOBAL 
JURIST, Issue 2, art. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gj.2008.8.2/gj.2008.8.2.1266/gj.2008.8.2.1266.xml. 
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practices.  While no political entity is entirely impervious to external 
influences, state borders erect a permeable barrier to such influences.  This 
in turn enables a sovereign people to experiment with, gain experience in, 
and institutionalize democracy.  In short, geographic borders frame the 
political space for democratic development and, in the view of some 
analysts, are vital to democratic development.18
This intervention has assumed two broad forms: (1) repression, 
including limitations on movement, free expression, free association, 
imprisonments, banishments, and ultimately, assassinations of Palestinian 
political leaders and (2) co-optation, meaning the provision of positive 
emoluments including tangible assets (money), access to power or office, 
business licenses, and the like.  The mix of these two broad forms of 
intervention—repression and co-optation—has varied over time and space, 
but a high level of outside intervention has been a constant feature of 
Palestinian political life. 
  That claim may go too far; 
that is, it is theoretically possible to imagine the emergence of democratic 
practices at the sub-state and supra-state levels.  Indeed, such emergence is 
empirically observable in the case of the Palestinians in local level 
organizing and political organizations (such as the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, and a number of its constituent organizations) that have 
spanned across state borders.  But there is little question that the absence of 
the protective shield of a state has rendered the Palestinians persistently 
vulnerable to other state authorities that have not hesitated to intervene in 
Palestinian affairs, often to radical effect. 
Outside intervention in Palestinian political life has had anti-democratic 
effects for two main reasons.  First, repression has often forced Palestinian 
politics underground; and secrecy and democracy, while not directly at odds, 
are certainly not easily reconciled.  Second, Palestinians’ aspirations for 
freedom and independence in their homeland has been consistently opposed 
by a series of powerful outside parties, who have intervened to install or 
support Palestinian leaders who were compliant to their wishes, not the 
wishes of the Palestinian people. 
 This was true, for example, of the British Mandate that ruled Palestine 
from 1923 to 1948, in which ruling authority was exercised by a British 
                                                     
18  In the view of some political scientists, state borders are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the establishment of a democratic system—the other condition being a balance 
of power between internal social forces that bars domination and the imposition of the will of 
some over others.  See generally LEV LUIS GRINBERG, POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN 
ISRAEL/PALESTINE (2010). 
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High Commissioner appointed from London.  Palestinian demands for 
democratic government during the Mandate period— one that would defend 
the interests of Palestinian Arabs, who were a majority of the population of 
the state—were consistently spurned by their British rulers.19  Instead, a 
Legislative Council was formed that joint-appointed British colonial officers 
with elected Palestinian and Jewish members.  Together the British 
appointees and Jewish members outnumbered the Palestinian members, 
despite the fact that Palestinians were 90% of the population at the beginning 
of the Mandate, and still 65% at the end of the Mandate after massive Jewish 
immigration.20
c. The Rise of Palestinian Democratic Practice 
  The British, of course, were compelled to deny the 
Palestinian drive for democratic government because the overwhelming 
majority of Palestinians staunchly opposed one of the prime objectives of the 
Mandate, to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine.  Virtually every 
powerful actor since then, including Israel, the Arab countries, and the 
United States, has similarly intervened to foil Palestinian democratic 
aspirations; not out of any hostility to democracy itself, but because of fear 
and hostility to the predicted outcome of democratic processes among 
Palestinians. 
 Despite these two formidable and enduring obstacles—geographic 
dispersion and external intervention—real progress began towards 
Palestinian democracy began with the takeover of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO).  The PLO, it will be recalled, was created by the Arab 
states in 1964 precisely as an instrument of co-optation and control of the 
Palestinian national movement.  It was headed by individuals appointed by 
the Arab League.21  Fateh, the Palestinian guerrilla organization that was 
founded in 1959 and had launched its first military operation against Israel in 
January 1965, engineered the takeover.22
                                                     
19 KHALIDI, supra note 8, at 33-36. 
  The takeover was consummated 
by the election of Yasser Arafat as Chair of the Executive Committee of the 
PLO at the fifth meeting of the Palestine National Council in 1969.  Fateh 
faced a strategic decision at the time whether or not to monopolize the 
resources of the PLO.  Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and others, 
20 See VICTOR KATTAN, FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST 62-63 (2009). 
21 See HILLEL FRISCH, COUNTDOWN TO STATEHOOD 17 (1998); JOOST R. HILTERMANN, 
BEHIND THE INTIFADA 38 (1991). 
22  The campaign by Fateh to take control of the organization is described in detail in 
HELENA COBBAN, THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (1984). 
  
 
Re-Democratizing Palestinian Politics 11 
Fateh opted for the principle of political pluralism—that is, fostering 
representation of other Palestinian political parties and resistance groups.23  
The Palestine National Council (PNC), the supreme policy-making body of 
the organization under the PLO’s Constitution, became a forum for vibrant, 
open, and democratic debate of the direction of the Palestinian national 
movement.24  The PLO encompassed not just resistance organizations, but 
also a variety of unions—of Palestinian workers, women, students, 
engineers, writers, and others—achieving very high levels of popular 
mobilization.25  In what ways did all this fall short of democratic practice?  
First, despite a clause in the PLO Charter requiring direct elections to the 
PNC, such elections never took place.  Instead, PNC members were 
nominated according to a quota system negotiated among leaders of the 
various Palestinian political organizations.  Nominated members were then 
confirmed by a vote of currently sitting PNC members.  This provided a 
veneer of democracy to what was functionally a top-down selection 
process.26  This pattern of elections that served to ordain outcomes 
orchestrated in advance by political elites has been characteristic of 
Palestinian politics in a number of other contexts as well.27  Second, while 
lateral political pluralism prevailed among organizations under the PLO 
umbrella, the internal administration of Palestinian political groups was not 
terribly democratic.  For some Palestinian groups, this was a legacy of their 
military natures.  Meanwhile, Palestinian leftist organizations, such as the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), had been steeped in the 
Leninist vision of democratic centralism.28
                                                     
23  The reasons for this choice are discussed in ALAIN GRESH, THE PLO: THE STRUGGLE 
WITHIN 11-14 (A.M. Berrett trans., 1983).  Chief among them, however, was the desire for 
unity as a means to foil the interference of Arab states in Palestinian affairs. 
  In either case, it was top-down 
management by the Palestinian political class that prevailed more often than 
bottom-up leadership from grassroots activists and local level leaders.
 Another significant flaw in Palestinian democracy was the fact that the 
PNC and the PLO disproportionately represented the Palestinian diaspora at 
24 See GRESH, supra note 23. 
25 COBBAN, supra note 22, at 13 (providing an organization chart of the PLO). 
26 Id. at 11. 
27 For example, this pattern can be seen in the internal leadership selection processes of the 
main Palestinian political and guerrilla organizations.  HILTERMANN, supra note 21, at 14. 
28 Both the PFLP and DFLP were outgrowths of the Arab Nationalist Movement, which 
Yezid Sayigh describes as mirroring the “classic pyramid of communist parties.”  YEZID 
SAYIGH, ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE 73-74 (1997). 
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the expense of Palestinian citizens of Israel and those living under Israeli 
military occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  This was due to a 
variety of factors, perhaps chief among them the preeminence of the PLO 
and its constituent organizations “that matured in the diaspora and whose 
program and ideology reflected that of the diaspora.”29  Meanwhile, 
Palestinians living within Israel or in the territories it occupied in 1967 were 
inhibited, barred from participation in national politics by the prospect of 
arrest, deportation, or other sanction by Israeli authorities.30  Finally, the 
PLO tacitly abandoned the task of representing the concerns of the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel as an outgrowth of its mid-seventies strategic 
shift away from the goal of a democratic secular state in all of former 
Mandate Palestine in favor of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip only.31  Whatever these democratic shortcomings, Palestinians 
tended to chalk them up to the hostile environments they faced.  As long as 
the PLO leadership was pursuing policies supported by a broad national 
consensus, conditions seemed adequately, if not perfectly, democratic.  The 
most significant rupture in the overall pattern described above occurred 
during the first Intifada, which erupted in late 1987 before waning in the 
early 1990s.  This was the Palestinian people’s most democratic 
movement—a true upswelling of grassroots sentiment and activism that 
momentarily shifted the political initiative out of the hands of diaspora elders 
and political fixers and into the hands of a youthful decentralized leadership 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  The Intifada was managed on a day-
to-day basis by a “Unified National Leadership of the Uprising.”  Its rotating 
membership both practiced and preached respect for democracy.32
                                                     
29 HILTERMANN, supra note 21, at 5. 
  This 
period was characterized by the invigoration of civil society thanks to a host 
30 Under Israeli military orders long in force in the West Bank, mere membership in an 
organization whose other members commit an offense, such as possession of a firearm, is 
punishable by life imprisonment.  Order Regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated 
Version] (Judea and Samaria) (No. 1651) 5770-2009, Article 231, available at 
http://nolegalfrontiers.org/en/military-orders/mil01/69-security-provisions-chapter6-209-262 
(military order 1651 consolidates several military orders from 1967-1970 among others).  A 
few Palestinian citizens of Israel gained prominence in the PLO, such as lawyer Sabri Jiryis 
and poet Mahmoud Darwish, but only by emigrating from Israel and accepting permanent 
exile from their homeland.  Others achieved positions in the PLO following deportation by 
Israeli authorities.  See COBBAN, supra note 22, at 171. 
31  See generally GRESH, supra note 23 (providing reasons for and debates surrounding this 
shift). 
32 See GLENN E. ROBINSON, BUILDING A PALESTINIAN STATE xi (1997); Ma’oz, supra note 
6, at 235. 
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of new non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—human rights groups, 
women’s groups, medical societies, and the like—that mobilized broad 
segments of Palestinian society in largely non-violent resistance to Israeli 
occupation.33
This new elite mobilized a transformed society in order to better 
confront the occupation.  By so doing, authority was pushed 
downward in a society away from the notable elite and toward a 
much broader spectrum of individuals.  The devolution of authority 
was seen directly in the Intifada by the emergence of thousands of 
popular institutions which organized Palestinian society under 
emergency conditions and which Israel found to be impossible to 
eliminate.  Sustained collective action, then, was directly linked to 
the reorganization of authority in Palestinian society by the 
mobilization efforts of the new elite.
  In the words of political scientist Glenn Robinson:  
34
The first Intifada also witnessed a visible increase in the public political role 
of Palestinian women.  And while the Intifada by no means permanently 
altered the patriarchal structure of Palestinian society, “women made 
important progress in raising consciousness of their rights in society, and 
more women were mobilized than ever before in organizational structures 
that channeled their energies toward satisfying, beyond demonstrations, the 
needs of a society under siege.”
 
35  Against these positive, democratizing 
trends that characterized the first Intifada, however, we must note other 
troubling developments.  First, this was also the era in which Palestinian 
Islamist organizations such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas rose to 
prominence.36  To be clear, these organizations were not inherently anti-
democratic.  Indeed, there is good evidence that Hamas, at least, has 
conducted its internal affairs in a far more democratic and disciplined 
manner than any of the secular nationalist Palestinian organizations.37
                                                     
33 The best study of the role of these NGO’s in the intifada is HILTERMANN, supra note 21. 
  
However, Hamas and other religiously-inspired Palestinian groups still 
raised the difficult and as yet unresolved issue of whether and how to 
integrate divergent Palestinian outlooks into a single national representative 
body.  Second, the Intifada was never simply a spontaneous outburst of 
34 ROBINSON, supra note 32, at xi. 
35 HILTERMANN, supra note 21, at 193. 
36 Palestinian Islamic Jihad had been formed in the early 1980’s, while Hamas, an offshoot 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded after the commencement of the first Intifada.  
ROBINSON, supra note 32, at 145-46, 149-50. 
37 See generally KHALED HROUB, HAMAS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2000). 
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Palestinian popular resentment against Israeli occupation giving rise to 
wholly new and independent political forces.  It was always simultaneously 
structured and guided by pre-existing Palestinian political groups; the 
Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, for example, consistently 
consulted the PLO leadership, then based in Tunis, on its proposed actions.38
II. THE DE-DEMOCRATIZATION OF PALESTINIAN POLITICS 
  
In any case, the old guard soon reasserted its hegemony over the Palestinian 
national movement, riding the wave of popular revolt into the Madrid peace 
talks in 1991, and as the Palestinian public was later to learn, the secret 
negotiations leading to the Oslo accords in 1993.  This, in a sense, was the 
beginning of the process of “de-democratization” of Palestinian politics that 
is the topic of the next part. 
There are a variety of ways to frame the development of Palestinian 
politicsin the era that began with the signing of the Oslo accords39
a. Downsizing Palestine 
 on the 
White House lawn in September 1993 and continues to the present.  In the 
opinion of this author, the period may be best characterized by two 
processes: the “downsizing of Palestine,” and the “domestication of the 
Palestinians.” 
Downsizing Palestine as used in this article refers to the conceptual and 
administrative reduction of “Palestine” to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
or to whatever remnants of those regions remain under effective Palestinian 
control.  Among Palestinians themselves, as well as among supporters of 
Palestinian national rights, the most common meaning of “Palestine” was 
traditionally the territory of former Mandate Palestine, which was viewed as 
the historic homeland of the Palestinian people.  Using the term “Palestine” 
in the aftermath of the founding of Israel in 1948 involved a symbolic denial 
of the legitimacy of Israel’s existence, and a normative assertion of the 
continuity of Palestine’s existence despite its actual demise as a political 
entity.  Prior to 2002, Israeli leaders, and their supporters, including U.S. 
politicians, rarely if ever used the term. 
                                                     
38 See HILTERMANN, supra note 21, at 174-76; Ma’oz, supra note 6, at 235. 
39 The “Oslo Accords” is the term commonly used to refer to a series of agreements 
reached between Israel and the PLO beginning with the first “Declaration of Principles” in 
1993.  See generally GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENTS (2010). 
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The rhetorical or conceptual shift toward a reduced meaning for 
“Palestine” is mostly a feature of Western political and media discourse, and 
has unfolded gradually over the last two decades— although a decisive turn 
occurred in 2002 when U.S. President George W. Bush formally adopted 
support for the establishment of a Palestinian state as a key element of U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Middle East.40  One notable public marker of the 
shift was Vice President Cheney’s repeated references to “Palestine” in his 
October 5, 2004, debate with John Edwards during the run-up to U.S. 
national elections.41
Other indications of the shift to a diminished meaning of “Palestine” are 
evident in common English-language media references to “Palestine,”
  While the exact meaning of his reference cannot be 
firmly established, surely he did not intend the expansive meaning of 
“Palestine” used by Palestinians.  His invoking the term as if “Palestine” was 
a present-tense reality strongly suggests that what he intended was the 
governing structures that had emerged as a consequence of the Oslo accords. 
42 or 
to Mahmoud Abbas as the “Palestinian president” (when he is, in fact, 
president of the Palestinian Authority, elected solely by the Palestinian 
residents of the Occupied Territories),43 and in polling data that purports to 
represent what “Palestinians” believe—data that are almost inevitably culled 
solely from residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip.44
                                                     
40  President Bush first announced support for a Palestinian state in a speech delivered June 
24, 2002.  See Full Text of George Bush’s Speech, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2002, 4:28 EDT), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jun/25/israel.usa. 
  The usage of a 
41 Transcript: Vice Presidential Debate, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/debatereferee/debate_1005.html. 
42 See, e.g., Tom Segev, Salam Fayyad, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 22, 2010, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/12/22/salam-fayyad-palestine-s-pm-on-
building-a-state.html (referencing Palestine’s Prime Minister). 
43 See, e.g., Israeli and Palestinian Premiers Will Meet This Month for Talks, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/middleeast/israeli-and-palestinian-
premiers-will-meet-this-month-for-talks.html?_r=1&ref=salamfayyad (referring to Abbas as 
“Palestinian president” and Salam Fayyad as “Palestinian prime minister”). 
44 See, e.g., Ron Ben-Tovim, Poll: Majority of Palestinians Believe UN Statehood Bid Will 
Succeed, HAARETZ (Sept. 18, 2011, 4:43 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-
defense/poll-majority-of-palestinians-believe-un-statehood-bid-will-succeed-1.385157; Hugh 
Naylor, Poll: Palestinians Believe Statehood Is Likely, NATIONAL (Oct. 1, 2011), 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/poll-palestinians-believe-statehood-is-
likely; Khaled Abu Toameh, Poll: Majority of Palestinians Think PA Is Corrupt, JERUSALEM 
POST (May 29, 2012), http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=271912. 
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diminished “Palestine” has also crept into some academic discourse on the 
region.45
It should be noted, however, that Palestinian leaders and officials may 
have unwittingly participated in producing this new meaning for “Palestine,” 
for it is not uncommon for them, too, to refer to “Palestine” as if it were an 
existing entity.
 
46
The administrative aspect of “downsizing” involves the progressive 
eclipse of the PLO by the Palestinian Authority (PA).  The PA was 
established via the Oslo Accords and was originally intended to serve as an 
interim self-governing authority for the Palestinians while “final status” 
issues (borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, security) were negotiated.  
Elections for a PA chief and for eighty-eight members of a new Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) were held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 
January 1996, purportedly for four-year terms.
  Undoubtedly it is their intention in using this term to 
normalize the concept of “Palestine” as a concrete reality, and thereby to 
gain acceptance for recognition of Palestine as a full-fledged state—almost 
as if that state could be spoken into existence.  We can think of this, perhaps, 
as Palestine in an “aspirational” sense.  But if that is what Palestinian leaders 
intend, it seems equally likely that unsympathetic others may instead take 
away an entirely different and empirical meaning: if “Palestine” exists today, 
then that term can only refer to the sub-state entity that currently operates in 
the West Bank and that exercises minimal and ambiguous authority over just 
parts of the West Bank.  Following the 2007 split in authority between 
Fateh, which controls the West Bank, and Hamas, which governs the Gaza 
Strip, it is no longer even self-evident that the Gaza Strip belongs to this 
“Palestine.”  If this is correct, Palestinian leaders themselves could be 
helping to pave the way for broad international acceptance of a vastly 
downsized “Palestine”—downsized geographically and downsized in 
governing authority from the robust sovereignty that is exercised by 
genuinely independent states. 
47
                                                     
45 See, e.g., Scott Lasensky, Chequebook Diplomacy: The US, the Oslo Process and the 
Role of Foreign Aid, in AID, DIPLOMACY AND FACTS ON THE GROUND: THE CASE OF PALESTINE 
41 (Michael Keating, Anne Le More & Robert Lowe eds., 2005) (“As part of this new push 
for peace, the US is injecting additional economic assistance into Palestine, already one of the 
world’s highest per capita recipients of international aid.”).  It is, of course, the PA that is the 
recipient of this aid, not “Palestine” as a whole. 
  In the early years of the 
46 Saeb Erekat, U.S. Elections: Palestine Can’t Wait, HAARETZ (Nov. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/u-s-elections-palestine-can-t-wait-1.475330 (PLO Executive 
Member and chief Palestinian negotiator referencing “Palestine” as if it were an existing 
entity). 
47 The membership of the PLC was increased in 2005 to 132.  AARON D. PINA, CONG. 
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PA, the PLC developed into a dynamic organization and became the 
repository for Palestinian democratic hopes.  Moreover, it was the main 
bastion against the emerging authoritarian tendencies of the Palestinian 
leadership, personified in Yasser Arafat.48
Meanwhile the institutions of the PLO, long recognized internationally 
as the official representative of the entire Palestinian people, fell into disuse 
and atrophy.  For example, after the birth of the PA, the PNC, which had met 
an average of once a year for its first two decades, met only in 1996, 1998, 
and then in 2009.
  But even under the best of 
circumstances, the PA, while sporting some of the trappings of democracy, 
functionally disenfranchised a majority of the Palestinian people who were 
not residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip and therefore did not 
participate in PA elections. 
49
b. Domesticating the Palestinians 
  The de-democratizing aspect of these developments is 
thus characterized by the elevation of a body representing a part of the 
Palestinian people over one representing the whole. 
The “domestication” of a people is an inherently demeaning concept.  
Domestication of animals, for example, typically involves penning them, 
feeding them, and reducing them to dependency on humans.  Yet that is, 
with scarce exaggeration, what the Palestinians of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip have been subjected to over the last decade. 
The “penning” of the Palestinians has been accomplished by smothering 
restrictions on the freedom of movement imposed by the Israeli military.  
Travel between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been almost 
completely barred, as has travel into East Jerusalem from the West Bank.  
Israel’s separation wall, road system, and associated administrative regime 
divide the West Bank into a series of geographically discontiguous cantons, 
or perhaps more accurately, bantustans. 
The “feeding” of the Palestinians and their reduction to dependency is 
manifest in massive infusions of foreign aid to the PA.  Some $7.5 billion 
was transferred to the PA from 2008-2010 alone, much of it from the United 
                                                     
RESEARCH SERV., RL33269, PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS 9 (2006). 
48 For example, the PLC drafted a law on the independence of the judiciary, largely to 
protect it against executive branch interference, and also a “basic law” that was intended to 
serve as a constitution installing separation of powers and other principles of democratic 
governance.  NATHAN J. BROWN, PALESTINIAN POLITICS AFTER THE OSLO ACCORDS: 
RESUMING ARAB PALESTINE 79 (2003); see also George E. Bisharat, Peace and the Political 
Imperative of Legal Reform in Palestine, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 253-91 (1999). 
49 See GRESH, supra note 23, at 254-55, for a list of PNC meetings from 1964-1983. 
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States and the European Union but from other sources as well.50
To put it bluntly, though hopefully not simplistically, massive aid 
rendered the PA more answerable to donors than to the Palestinian public it 
allegedly served.  Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of this fact is in the 
establishment of security forces—that Palestinians refer to as “Drayton’s 
brigades” for their trainer and organizer, U.S. General Keith Drayton—
whose performance is measured by how well they defend not Palestinians, 
but Israelis.  The Israelis in question, meanwhile, are not simply those living 
peacefully in Tel Aviv but include the soldiers and civilian settlers who are 
engaged in the continuing illegal settlement of the West Bank.  One would 
have to search hard in history to find another example of an occupied people 
that is charged with the responsibility of guaranteeing the security of its 
occupiers. 
  This aid 
has had a variety of adverse and anti-democratic effects. 
Foreign aid also enabled the outside Palestinian leadership, returning to 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the mid-1990’s, to secure their 
political standing via patronage, rather than in earning legitimacy by 
actualizing Palestinian public aspirations and interests.  This was 
accomplished mainly by providing employment in the PA, leading to a 
bloated bureaucracy of some 140,000 employees.51
A parallel development occurred as well at the level of civil society. 
NGOs that had played such a vital role during the First Intifada, or those 
founded after the Olso accords, similarly went on the foreign aid dole, giving 
rise to a new highly-paid “NGO aristocracy.”  Like the PA itself, these 
NGOs seemed to many Palestinians to be “cut off from the grassroots and 
democratic structures that existed to represent the plurality of views in 
Palestinian civil society.”
 
52
Much more could be written to elaborate on this period, but to 
summarize in the interest of brevity, this was an era of massive external 
 
                                                     
50 Other major donors include the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, the United 
Arab Emirates, Norway, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Japan and France.  See Aid 
Statistics of West Bank & Gaza Strip, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/XPA.gif (last 
updated Feb. 19, 2013). 
51 See WORLD BANK, STAGNATION OR REVIVAL? PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 13 
(2012), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WorldBankAHLCrepo
rtMarch2012.pdf. 
52  Karma Nabulsi, The State-Building Project: What Went Wrong?, in AID, DIPLOMACY 
AND FACTS ON THE GROUND: THE CASE OF PALESTINE, supra note 45, at 124; see also 
RLFPalestine, Donor Opium, the Impact of International Aid to Palestine, YOUTUBE (Dec. 
20, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVTYyRLMljc. 
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intervention in Palestinian political affairs that had mostly anti-democratic 
effects.  It would be wrong, however, to claim that the downward turn in the 
arc of Palestinian democratic practice during this period were solely due to 
external influence.  On the contrary, many Palestinians were active partners 
in this sordid venture.  Both Palestinian governments, in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, have imprisoned and tortured political opponents,53 trampled 
press freedoms,54
III. PALESTINIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS 
 appropriated the resources of the Palestinian people for 
partisan or party gain, and have otherwise acted like petty tyrants.  There is, 
unfortunately, plenty of blame to be shared. 
The so-called “Arab Spring” had effects on the movement for 
democracy among Palestinians at both intangible and tangible levels.  At the 
intangible level, the uprisings in Tunis and Cairo served to remind 
Palestinians of the power of non-violent grassroots activism, and offered an 
inspiring model for resistance to oppression by Arab youths equipped with 
the new tools of social media.  The impending changes in neighboring Arab 
countries also boosted morale among Palestinians by promising to usher in 
Arab governments whose policies would more consistently reflect their 
peoples’ palpable sympathy for the Palestinian cause.  For Palestinians both 
young and old, however, the uprisings in surrounding countries against 
indigenous autocracies raised additional complex questions: who would be 
the target of a new Palestinian uprising?  Their own “unelected, 
unrepresentative, unprincipled, and visionless”55
In fact, disillusionment if not disgust among Palestinian youths with 
their official leaders was manifest even before the outbreak of the so-called 
“Arab Spring.”  A Facebook post by eight young men and women calling 
themselves “Gaza Youth Breaks Out” (GYBO) in late 2010 began strikingly 
 leaders or Israel, the most 
persistent and violent denier of their freedoms? 
                                                     
53 Annual Report: Palestinian Authority 2011, AMNESTY INT’L USA (May 28, 2011), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-palestinian-authority-2011; Gaza: 
Hamas Should End Killings, Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 20, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/20/gaza-hamas-should-end-killings-torture. 
54  See Israeli-Occupied Territories and Palestinian Authority, FREEDOM HOUSE (2011), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2011/israeli-occupied-territories-and-
palestinian-authority (last visited Feb. 26, 2013); Palestinian Authority/Israel: Escalating 
Assault on Free Expression, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/03/palestinian-authorityisrael-escalating-assault-free-
expression. 
55 BARGHOUTI, supra note 3, at 7. 
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with an expletive-laced condemnation of both major Palestinian parties, 
Fateh and Hamas, along with Israel, the U.S., and the international 
community for their neglect of the aspirations of young Palestinians for 
basic freedoms.56  The post created a firestorm of controversy, but seemed to 
open the floodgates of internal criticism within Palestinian society.  One of 
the prominent grievances was the continuing split within the Palestinian 
movement between Hamas and Fateh, groups that since a violent rift in 
2007, had ruled in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively.  As one of 
the GYBO members stated: “Politics is bollocks, it is screwing our lives up.  
Politicians only care about money and their supporters.  The Israelis are the 
only ones benefiting from the division.”57
“National reconciliation” between Fateh and Hamas was a central 
demand of the “15 March Movement,” the first visible response to the events 
in Tunis and Cairo to be reflected in the Palestinian territories.  The short-
lived “movement” was formed by a loosely coordinated group of Palestinian 
young men and women who were not affiliated with established Palestinian 
political parties.  They called for mass demonstrations on March 15, 2011, in 
both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, adding a call of direct elections to 
the Palestine National Council to their demands.
 
58  The demonstrations, 
ultimately, were sparsely attended, and were infiltrated by Fateh activists in 
Ramallah and Hamas activists in Gaza City, each seeking to co-opt the 
movement.  Moreover, in Gaza City some demonstrators were beaten by 
Hamas sympathizers.59
Despite the relatively modest showings by the March 15 Movement, it is 
clear that Palestinian officialdom in the West Bank and Gaza Strip took note 
of the challenges to their authority and reacted accordingly.  National 
reconciliation talks between Fateh and Hamas were quickly revived, leading 
to the signing of a new unity agreement on May 11, 2011.  New elections to 
the PLC were promised.  Palestinian negotiators stiffened their spines in 
 
                                                     
56 The text of the “Gaza Youth Manifesto” is viewable at Gaza Youth Manifesto, GAZA 
YOUTH BREAKS OUT, http://gazaybo.wordpress.com/manifesto-0-1/ (last visited Feb. 26, 
2013). 
57 Ana Carbajosa, Gazan Youth Issue Manifesto to Vent Their Anger with All Sides in 
the Conflict, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/02/free-
gaza-youth-manifesto-palestinian. 
58 A full list of 15 March Movement demands may be viewed at The Demands of the 
#Mar15 Movement Youth of Palestine, OCCUPIED PALESTINE (Mar. 19, 2011), 
http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2011/03/19/the-demands-of-the-mar15-movement-
youth-of-palestine/. 
59 Karl Vick, On the Run, the Palestinian Youth Movement May Yet Get Its Way, TIME 
(Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2061661,00.html. 
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discussions with Israel, insisting, in particular, on a freeze in Israeli 
settlement activity as a condition for resuming broader peace negotiations.  
The PLO’s Fall 2011 campaign for upgraded status in the United Nations 
may also have been stimulated in part by the leadership’s need to 
demonstrate initiative in the face of stagnation in the two decade long “peace 
process.” 
While the March 15 Movement later dissipated without apparent lasting 
impact, other similar groups have proved somewhat more durable.  Hirak al-
Shababi al-Mustaqil, the “Independent Youth Movement” (IYM), has 
continued to organize protests and other events.  On May 15, 2012, for 
example, IYM contributed to organizing a march to Ofer military prison in 
the West Bank, highlighting the concerns of Palestinian political prisoners 
facing administrative detention and other forms of long-term incarceration 
without trial.60
The regional political changes wrought by the Arab uprisings have also 
exercised more tangible effects on Palestinian politics as well.  Civil unrest 
in Syria, for example, led to Hamas’s external wing’s evacuation from 
Damascus to Cairo by February 2012.  More importantly, however, are the 
tangible changes that have occurred along the border between the Gaza Strip 
and Egypt.  Prior to the fall of the Mubarak regime, Egypt had mostly 
cooperated in Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip by keeping its border with that 
region tightly restricted, if not closed.  Partly due to the chaos that has 
reigned in the Sinai Peninsula after Mubarak’s fall, and partly due to the 
deliberate policy of the interim Egyptian government to ease travel and trade 
restrictions across the Gaza border, traffic of both people and goods has now 
soared.  Building materials formerly banned by Israel are pouring into the 
Gaza Strip, leading to a 220% increase in housing starts.  Gaza officials have 
accordingly reduced time estimates for repairing the damage to housing 
caused by Israel’s 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead from eight decades to as 
little as five years.
 
61
Not surprisingly, the economic boom in the Gaza Strip is contributing 
considerably to the revival of the political fortunes of Hamas, which 
arguably has demonstrated that steadfastness in the face of sanctions can be 
a viable strategy.  This, in turn, may point a way forward for the Palestinians 
as a whole, and create pressure on the Palestinian leadership to adopt 
 
                                                     
60 Tomorrow - Nakba Commemoration March to Ofer Prison, STOP WALL (May 14, 2012), 
http://stopthewall.org/2012/05/14/tomorrow-nakba-commemoration-march-ofer-prison. 
61 Nicholas Pelham, Gaza’s Tunnel Complex, 261 MIDDLE E. REP. 30, 32-33, available at 
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer261/gazas-tunnel-complex. 
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strategies that more accurately reflect the interests and demands of their 
people. 
Yet just as the apparent gains of the Arab uprisings have been 
ephemeral, so too is the ultimate impact of those uprisings on the direction 
of Palestinian efforts to achieve democracy.  As one Palestinian 
commentator was moved to observe: “the Palestinian people living in their 
occupied homeland have remained quiescent.  Neither have mass protests 
targeted the Palestinian ‘regime’s’ policies or negotiating performance, nor 
has resistance to Israeli occupation escalated or taken more effective 
forms.”62
IV. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
  For many Palestinians, the scenes of unarmed Arab civilians 
facing armed state authority were highly reminiscent of their own first 
Intifada, a comparison that was implicitly referenced in the description of 
the multiple uprisings as “intifadat” (plural of intifada).  While Palestinians 
may have experienced pride in knowing that they had, with their first 
Intifada, led the way for other Arabs by more than two decades later, the 
successes of their neighbors must also have acted as poignant reminders of 
how far the Palestinians had fallen short in their ultimate aims of freedom 
and independence. 
In this part we will consider the major prescriptions that Palestinians 
themselves have propounded for democratic reform: national reconciliation, 
rolling back of the Oslo Accords, and reforming the PLO.  None of these 
prescriptions are straightforward, easy to achieve, or without risks or costs. 
a. National Reconciliation 
National reconciliation, meaning a healing of the rift between Fateh and 
Hamas and the restoration of political unity, is the first demand of almost all 
those who seek reform of the Palestinian movement.  Like the GYBO 
member quoted above, virtually all Palestinians recognize that division has 
hurt their political interests.  National unity, moreover, may be a necessary 
condition for Palestinians to effectively field a strategy of non-violence.  As 
political scientist Wendy Pearlman argues, only cohesive movements for 
self-determination can enforce discipline among followers and achieve the 
levels of mass mobilization necessary for effective non-violence.63
                                                     
62 Raja Khalidi, After the Arab Spring in Palestine: Contesting the Neoliberal Narrative of 
Palestinian National Liberation, JADALIYYA (Mar. 23, 2012), 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4789/after-the-arab-spring-in-palestine_contesting-
the-. 
 
63 WENDY PEARLMAN, VIOLENCE, NONVIOLENCE, AND THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL 
  
 
Re-Democratizing Palestinian Politics 23 
It is fair to view national reconciliation as a form of democratization; it 
would bring all Palestinian politics into one forum and would force open 
debate over the direction of the national movement.  But insofar as it would 
reinstate the former hegemony of the Palestinian political class without 
challenging its top-down style of management, national reconciliation is 
necessary but not sufficient to foster true democratization.  Moreover, 
discussions of national reconciliation do not typically address how the 
political parties would engage with the vibrant movement that has emerged 
since 2005 in Palestinian civil society in support of boycotts, divestment, 
and sanctions.64
Finally, it is almost certain that national reconciliation between Fateh 
and Hamas would lead Israel to suspend all efforts to resume negotiations 
with the Palestinians.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has 
repeatedly warned PA President Mahmoud Abbas that “[i]t’s either a pact 
with Hamas, or peace with Israel . . . you can’t have them both.”
 
65  
Furthermore, the U.S., like Israel, considers Hamas a “terrorist 
organization,” and is likely to suspend aid to the PA should reconciliation 
lead to the appointment of Hamas members to senior PA posts.66
b. Rolling Back the Oslo Accords 
  How great 
a loss these developments would cause Palestinians is questionable: 
negotiations over more than two decades seem only to have provided Israel a 
screen behind which to continue its inexorable colonization of the West 
Bank, and U.S. aid has come at great expense to Palestinian political 
independence and freedom of operation. 
Rolling back the Oslo Accords could potentially involve a variety of 
measures, from ending security cooperation with Israel to abolishing the PA 
altogether.  In Palestinian discussions regarding these possibilities, the 
measures are not generally conceptualized as means of democratization, but 
rather as a way to throw back the administrative costs of military occupation 
of the West Bank on Israel.  To the extent that the PA has supplanted the 
PLO and functionally disenfranchised Palestinian citizens of Israel and 
Palestinian refugees, the abolition of the PA might begin to restore the PLO 
                                                     
MOVEMENT, (2011). 
64 See generally BARGHOUTI, supra note 3. 
65 Fatah-Hamas Unity Government: Israel Condemns Move, BBC (Feb. 6, 2012, 11:29 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16918834. 
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to its former centrality in Palestinian political life and bring with it a more 
frank and fulsome consideration of the interests of the Palestinian people as 
a whole. 
Yet this option is fraught with concern as well.  The welfare of the 
140,000 PA employees and their families must be considered, not to mention 
the legal implications of what would seem to be a clear breach of the Oslo 
Accords.  Nonetheless, it is an option that appeals to many Palestinians, 
including popular leaders such as Marwan Barghouti.  Such an option 
deserves further study and discussion.67
c. Reforming the PLO 
 
Reform of the PLO has been a subject of discussion among Palestinian 
intellectuals and activists for much of the last decade.  The two major 
contemplated reforms are the inclusion of Palestinian Islamist parties under 
the PLO rubric and direct elections for the PNC.  The first, obviously, is a 
variation on the theme of national reconciliation and thus requires no further 
discussion here. 
Direct elections to the PNC are, as previously noted, stipulated in the 
charter of the PLO and are difficult if not impossible to oppose in principle.  
Indeed, the ostensible reason for the resort to other means of selection for 
PNC membership was purely practical: given the geographic dispersion of 
the Palestinian people in 1948, it has simply never been possible to organize 
elections in which all Palestinians could vote. 
Yet with the advent of new technology, the practical obstacles to direct 
Palestinian elections are becoming less formidable.  That is the apparent 
logic behind a current web-based voter registration drive spearheaded by 
Palestinian diaspora activists dubbed “Palestinians Register.”68
                                                     
67 See Avi Issacharoff, Barghouti Calls on Palestinians to Launch Popular Resistance 
Against Israel, HAARETZ (Mar. 27, 2012, 9:08 AM), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/barghouti-calls-on-palestinians-to-launch-
popular-resistance-against-israel-1.420954. 
  The drive 
was publicly announced on November 11, 2011, and an online registration 
period was to commence in May 2012 and close in October 2012.  As of 
now the campaign only seeks voter registration, and the campaign would end 
once the registry is complete.  It seems evident that the ultimate aim of the 
organizers is to see that democratic elections actually occur.  By assembling 
the necessary voting data, the organizers are seemingly depriving the current 
Palestinian leadership of any pretext for not conducting elections; they are 
68 PALESTINIANS REG., http://palestiniansregister.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2013). 
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thus creating moral pressure on them to follow through on previous promises 
to do so.69
One challenging issue that the campaign for direct PNC elections must 
face is the potential participation of Palestinian citizens of Israel, either as 
voters or as candidates for PNC membership.  Prominent Israeli politicians, 
such as former foreign minister Tzipi Livni, have stated that Palestinian 
citizens of Israel should seek the fulfillment of their national aspirations in a 
Palestinian state.
 
70  At least some saw in this the hint that Palestinian 
citizens of Israel might face possible demotion to something like non-voting 
permanent residents.  Current Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman 
has also proposed that Palestinian citizens of Israel be required to sign a 
loyalty oath to Israel, including avowal of it as a “Jewish and democratic 
state.”71
In light of current political challenges, another significant question 
concerns what further reforms to the PLO are due. In particular, once the 
reality sinks in more broadly that the two-state solution is not around the 
corner, as it has appeared for the last two decades, and that the Israeli 
colonizing juggernaut in the West Bank has not lost and will not lose any 
  The question, then, for proponents of the participation of 
Palestinian citizens in PNC elections is: how would Israel’s politicians likely 
respond were Palestinian citizens of the state to avow affiliation to the PLO?  
Would this give right wing Israeli politicians the impetus they need to 
demote Palestinian citizens of Israel to non-voting status?  The answer is not 
clear, but the danger may be averted by a commitment on the part of the 
PLO to assume a more active role in advocating the rights and interests of 
Palestinian citizens of Israel—a role long since abdicated—while not 
requiring their formal institutional affiliation with the PLO. 
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momentum, what direction should the Palestinian national movement take?  
Will Palestinians shift, as former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert put it, 
from an “Algerian paradigm” of struggle to a “South African one”?72  And if 
it does, how must an organization cast in the Algerian model adapt?73
CONCLUSION 
  That 
is one of the most salient questions facing the Palestinian people today. 
In view of what has transpired since early 2011 in the surrounding Arab 
countries, and considering the histories of their own uprisings against Israeli 
military occupation, must the quest of Palestinians for democratization be 
advanced through another, third Intifada?  There is no clear response to this 
question.  At the time of this writing, the progress of the various Arab 
uprisings in achieving democratic change is decidedly mixed.  And if it is 
true that Palestinian democratic practice reached a peak in the first Intifada, 
the same cannot be said for the second or “Al-Aqsa Intifada” that broke out 
in October 2000 and extended into 2005-2006.74  Certainly, the causes and 
surrounding circumstances of the two Palestinian Intifadat differ in a number 
of critical respects, and any comparison should be made with 
circumspection.  Perhaps the most visible difference is in the relative 
militarization of the second Intifada.  While the first Intifada involved 
mostly unarmed Palestinian civilians and achieved high levels of mass 
mobilization, the second Intifada involved considerably greater armed 
violence, including, infamously, suicide bombings, that consigned the vast 
majority of Palestinian citizens to the sidelines.  There is at least a 
suggestion in this contrast that a non-violent uprising has greater 
democratizing potential than a violent one.75
Israel, of course, violently repressed both Palestinian Intifadat, although 
it employed vastly more lethal weapons in the second than in the first.  This 
calls to mind another, darker interpretation of the consequences of the 
Palestinian uprisings: both offered Israel opportunities to consolidate its 
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control over the West Bank, although in different ways.  Indeed, Israeli 
journalist Amira Hass argues that the Israeli right wing is spoiling for a third 
intifada: “[n]ot because they want an intifada, but because they want to 
suppress it.  They want an outbreak to occur, while the Arab world is mired 
in civil wars both hot and cold.  Their interest is in reaping demographic and 
territorial dividends from that uprising.  How?  For example in a mass 
expulsion of Palestinians to Jordan—the “Palestinian State” according to 
many a settler.”76
In some respects, then, the challenges to Palestinian democracy seem 
only to have mounted.  Whether the Palestinian people are able to meet these 
challenges will only be known over time, and likely after long, bitter, and 
painful struggle. 
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